Ridding PES Systems of the “Pay to Pollute” Principle: PES Optimization Strategies by Carlson, Kelly
Sustainable Development Law & Policy
Volume 16
Issue 1 Land and Water Use in the United States Article 6
Ridding PES Systems of the “Pay to Pollute”
Principle: PES Optimization Strategies
Kelly Carlson
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/sdlp
Part of the Agriculture Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Energy and Utilities Law
Commons, Environmental Law Commons, Food and Drug Law Commons, Health Law and Policy
Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, International Law
Commons, International Trade Law Commons, Land Use Law Commons, Law and Society
Commons, Law of the Sea Commons, Litigation Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, Oil,
Gas, and Mineral Law Commons, Public Law and Legal Theory Commons, and the Water Law
Commons
This Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sustainable Development Law & Policy by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carlson, Kelly (2017) "Ridding PES Systems of the “Pay to Pollute” Principle: PES Optimization Strategies," Sustainable Development
Law & Policy: Vol. 16 : Iss. 1 , Article 6.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/sdlp/vol16/iss1/6
23Fall 2015
Ridding PES SyStEmS of thE “Pay to PollutE” 
PRinciPlE: PES oPtimization StRatEgiES
By Kelly Carlson
With a stronger call to action on political and interna-tional relation fronts, the time to take meaningful action and to implement any necessary reform per-
taining to climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies 
is now.1 In fact, upcoming annual climate change negotiations 
led by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) make for the most sensible platform to re-
evaluate climate change proposals and contemplate areas need-
ing reform.2
At the center of these climate change negotiations and 
the UNFCCC work are country commitments.3 Country com-
mitments are either hard or soft—meaning that they are either 
hard number commitments to reduce pollutant emissions by a 
certain amount or that they are commitments to implement vari-
ous programs and strategies designed to reduce emissions in the 
aggregate.4 Countries making hard commitments in furtherance 
of the often cited two-degree goal are skeptical of those coun-
tries only willing to address climate change in the form of soft 
commitment pledges.5 The skepticism might be warranted, espe-
cially for programs such as Payment for Environmental Services 
(PES), which have a questionable impact on climate change 
mitigation goals.6 PES as a mitigation scheme and its ability to 
effectively address climate change as currently leveraged, is the 
focus of this Article.
The traditional PES program operates as follows: a farmer or 
landowner agrees to manage their land, either taking or abating 
specific action, to provide an ecological service (e.g. biodiversity 
conservation, carbon sequestration, or ecotourism promotion); 
payments to the farmers and landowners operate as incentives, 
making this system, in its traditional form, most similar to other 
market-based strategies.7 Variations of this general scheme have 
developed, especially to cover other natural resources in need of 
conservation, namely watersheds.8 No matter the form a PES 
program may take, one constant remains— all PES schemes 
propagate the oft criticized “pay to pollute” concept.9 Countries 
implementing PES and other “pay to pollute” projects in less 
developed countries are negating emissions reductions realized 
by the countries receiving the financial support because they 
continue to pollute on their own home fronts, failing to create 
any positive change in the aggregate.10
PES, having been implemented in various forms for decades, 
has proven effective in certain ways: helping landowners realize 
economic benefits in conserving the land rather than harvesting 
it, stimulating local economies and effectively redistributing 
wealth, and enabling the achievement of conservation goals, at 
least locally.11 Despite these positives, current PES programs 
come up short on meeting true conservation goals devoid of 
deceptive payor and service provider practices.12 Vast improve-
ment is necessary if society and climate change negotiators 
are to start viewing climate change strategies under a renewed 
lens—one that scoffs at promoting the “pay to pollute” concept 
in all its forms.
This Article argues that there are ways to achieve a more 
pure PES scheme, accurately reflecting conservationist goals, 
and devoid of the bad taste some of these soft commitment strat-
egies leave in the mouths of fellow climate change negotiators.13 
Five strategies for dissociating the “pay to pollute” concept cur-
rently intertwined with PES programs, and for realizing greater 
conservation gains include:
1  Decouple the payments from market value–This 
objective aims to recover the PES goals of steward-
ship and accountability. Traditionally, payments for 
environmental services, such as conservation of forest 
hectares are determined by assessing the value of tim-
ber on the open marketplace.14 To posit that forests only 
have inherent value as timber, a mere commodity is to 
detract from the very reason PES was introduced as a 
conservation method. Ideologically, true conservation-
ism and pollution mitigation are in direct contention 
with market and economic based incentives. Instead 
of lost opportunity in the marketplace,15 conservation 
payments should reflect the opportunity cost of keeping 
the environment and ecological systems intact should 
harvesting of the land’s resources occur. Though not 
a currently contemplated payment scheme, it draws 
parallels to restoration cost accounting conducted after 
hazardous substance and oil spills in United States.16
2  Rid of the voluntary off-sets payment scheme–
Paying PES providers for the carbon offsets created 
and for revenues generated from the sale of carbon 
credits provides them with a renewed license to pollute 
and negates any positive change realized from PES 
programs.17 For example, the Australian Afforestation 
Pty. Ltd. entails creating a timber plantation and carbon 
sinks for carbon credits so that Toyota can turn around 
and continue emitting carbon dioxide in its manufactur-
ing process, operations, and the product it produces.18
3  Target developed countries - This objective refocuses 
efforts away from traditional PES targets—undevel-
oped countries19 toward more sound prospects—devel-
oped countries with stronger socioeconomic posture. 
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These countries are better positioned to realize the 
environmental benefits of PES, without giving way 
to the volatility that PES projects might instigate.20 
Developed countries are more likely to have reliable 
governance structures and reporting mechanisms in 
place to ensure the ancillary problems associated with 
PES are kept at bay, including leakage, slippage, and 
sham agreements.21 Developed countries are also more 
likely to attribute greater value to conservation,22 rather 
than placing products in the marketplace, so they will 
not be tempted to engage in corruptive PES practices.
4  Target community property regimes–This objec-
tive contemplates that land held communally may be 
more suitable for PES projects for a number of rea-
sons. When land is held communally, there are more 
accountable parties to the contract, more watchful 
eyes, and are innately better designed for governance 
purposes because reporting of progress is centralized.23 
Ownership rights of lands held communally are less 
confusing and create less opportunity for individualized 
ulterior motives when compared to individually owned 
property, which can be “owned” in a variety of ways 
(i.e. access, use, exclusion, and management rights).24 
Collective management may be the answer to a more 
productive and self-governing PES provider profile.
5  Focus on financial integrity–This objective recognizes 
that not all funding sources are created equal due to 
lack of governance, control, and transparency. These 
shortcomings can be found in both private investment 
scenarios and investment banking undertakings. There 
is less governance and visibility overall when private 
investors are simply paying for ad-hoc projects to abate 
the effects of their pollution activity.25 Without a central 
reporting mechanism, these agreements are merely 
contracts between private parties with uncontrolled 
externalities.26 Investment banking PES implementa-
tions tend to institute more safeguards, but governance 
is still left to the banks’ discretion in most cases. The 
European Investment Bank (EIB) is an example of gov-
ernance headed in the right direction.27 It has reporting 
and enforcement safeguards in place to ensure its project 
funds are being used effectively and as intended.28 It also 
practices holistic project evaluation before backing fund-
ing by ensuring unintended consequences that might 
actually harm the objective of the project are evaluated.29
Implementing all five objectives in one fell swoop may 
prove difficult. However, some countries have already figured 
out how to implement the meat of these strategies using nation-
ally based PES systems. Though not perfect, nationally based 
systems remain leaders in effective conservation strategies. 
Mexico, for example, launched its national program, Program 
for Payments of Environmental Services (PSAB), in 2003, which 
is centrally funded, leverages strong institutional arrangements, 
and makes use of the communal property regime.30 Payments 
are made annually only after progress and compliance are veri-
fied through site visits and remote sensing.31 Monitoring proce-
dures are implemented by the National Forestry Commission 
(CONAFOR), which delegates PSAB enforcement responsi-
bilities to a sub-committee.32 Because the sub-committee is 
comprised of stakeholders covering all facets of PES projects,33 
transparency is easily accomplished.
As a result, Mexico boasts more forested areas today; in 
2010, as compared to 2000, Mexico is now deforesting less than 
155 hectares per year as compared to 354 hectares annually.34 
As deforestation continues to fall steadily in Mexico, PSAB 
has increased the value of forests to the community through 
enhanced carbon stocks.35
Overall, PES systems today are flawed and present opportu-
nities for improvement using the five strategies described and the 
Mexican system as a framework for successful implementation. 
National PES systems are more effective and true to conserva-
tion efforts because they are better positioned to implement the 
five optimization strategies.36 Changing the way countries think 
about soft commitments in climate change negotiations will 
prove important for upcoming UNFCCC conferences where a 
greater sense of social and environmental responsibility is likely 
expected from both developing and developed countries.37 So 
long as true conservationism is placed on the forefront of climate 
change agendas, the once pervasive “pay to pollute” sentiment 
should fall to the wayside. 
EndnotEs: Ridding PEs systEms of thE “Pay to PollutE” PRinciPlE: PEs  
oPtimization stRatEgiEs
1  See generally Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation, Global Green-
house Warming, http://www.global-greenhouse-warming.com/climate-mitiga-
tion-and-adaptation.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2015) (defining climate change 
mitigation versus adaptation components to climate change agreements);. 
see Climate Change and President Obama’s Action Plan, The White House, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/climate-change (last visited Nov. 6, 2015) (describ-
ing the components and objectives of the Clean Power Plan—a plan setting a 
carbon dioxide emissions reduction target to 32% below 2005 levels by 2030, 
creating first-ever standards for existing power plants); Mark Landler, U.S. and 
China Reach Climate Accord After Months of Talks, n.y. timEs  
(Nov. 11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/world/asia/china-us-xi-
obama-apec.html?_r=0 (reporting on the coined “landmark” reciprocal agree-
ment between the United States and China to curb carbon emissions by 2025 
and 2030, respectively).
2  The UNFCCC is a conglomerate of signee countries to an international 
treaty focused on mitigating, adapting to, and abating the impacts of climate 
change detrimentally impacting ecology and the environment. The focus of 
continued on page 40
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128  See id. at 1538.
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130  See Mogk, supra note 103, at 1540 (stating that “agriculture in an urban 
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131  See supra Part II B at 8 (discussing water needs for aquaponics system).
132  See IBC, international code coUncil (2012), available at http://publice-
codes.cyberregs.com/icod/ibc/2012/icod_ibc_2012_intro.htm (referencing the 
Preface to the code) (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) [hereinafter IBC].
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Buildings: A Comparative Law Approach Featuring the United States and the 
European Union, 23 va. envtl. l.J. 397, 409 (2005).
134  See iBc, supra note 133, at Preface.
135  See id.
136  See id. at § 101.2.
137  See id. at § 312.1.
138  See id.
139  See id.
140  See id. at § 202(defining “agricultural building” as “[a] structure designed 
and constructed to house farm implements, hay, grain, poultry, livestock or 
other horticultural products. This structure shall not be a place of human habita-
tion or a place of employment where agricultural products are processed, treated 
or packaged, nor shall it be a place used by the public).
141  See id. at § 3401.1-3401.6.
142  See id. at § 3401.2.
143  See id. at § 3401.3.
144  See King, supra note 134, at 409.
145  See, e.g., Phoenix, ariz., 2012 Phoenix BUilding conStrUction code 
amendmentS (2012), available at https://www.phoenix.gov/pdd/devcode/build-
ingcode (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
146  Id.
147  See generally, King, supra note 134, at 397-402 (discussing the benefits 
of green building standards and how municipalities can incentivize green 
development).
148  See id.
149  See id.
150  See iBc, supra note 133, at § 312.1.
151  See id.
152  See city of Phoenix, indoor agricUltUre occUPancy claSSificationS 
(2013), available at https://www.phoenix.gov/pddsite/Documents/dsd_trt_
pdf_00756.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2015).
153  See id.
154  See iBc, supra note 133, at § 202.
155  See city of Phoenix, supra note 153.
156  See id. (demonstrating potentially using F-1 Factory Industrial Moderate-
hazard and Mercantile classifications for Indoor Agricultural Facilities).
157  See id.
158  See iBc, supra note 133, at § 306.2.
159  See city of Phoenix, supra note 153.
160  See id.
161  See iBc, supra note 133, at § 302.1 (stating that “structures or portions of 
structures shall be classified with respect to occupancy in one or more of the 
groups listed below.”).
162  See city of Phoenix, supra note 153.
163  See id.
164  See supra Part IV A (discussing how current building codes function).
165  See supra Part II A (giving a background on how an aquaponics farm 
works).
166  See iBc, supra note 133, at § 202.
167  See id.
168  See id.
169  See supra Part II B (referencing the cost of water and sixteen to eighteen 
hours of light each plant needs).
170  See Wells, supra note 4 (discussing renewables in aquaponics farms).
171  See supra Part II B (noting the energy requirements discussed earlier in the 
Article, and that operations will be required to connect to the grid if they are 
unable to produce enough renewable energy themselves).
172  See supra Part II B (discussing how aquaponics farms do not require 
fertilizers).
the UNFCCC is on stabilizing greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the 
atmosphere to a less volatile and more sustainable level. See Background on the 
UNFCCC: The International Response to Climate Change, http://unfccc.int/
essential_background/items/6031.php (last visited Nov. 13, 205) [hereinafter 
“Background on the UNFCCC”].
3  See id.; see also Kyoto Protocol, United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php (last visited 
Nov. 6, 2015) (describing the role of the Kyoto Protocol was to set internation-
ally binding emissions reduction targets).
4  See generally id. (discussing hard number commitments); Reducing Emis-
sions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and the Role of Conserva-
tion, Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon 
Stocks in Developing Countries (REDD-plus), UNFCCC Int., http://unfccc.
int/land_use_and_climate_change/redd/items/7377.php (last visited Nov. 14, 
2015) (discussing the REDD program which involves other countries helping 
to finance and provide technical support to developing countries to abate and 
reverse the effects of deforestation).
5  See generally richard B. Stewart et al., climate finance: Key concePtS 
and wayS forward 1-2, available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/
Stewart_Final_2.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2015).
6  PES is known by other names including Payment for Ecosystem Services 
and Green Growth Strategies, but each refers to the same basic type of agree-
ment in which there is a service provider—the landowner, and there is a 
payor—the person, private company, non-profit, or governmental entity paying 
for conservation efforts. See generally org. for econ. cooPeration and dev., 
green growth and develoPing coUntrieS: conSUltation draft, 10-11, Org. 
for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev., (June 2012), available at http://www.google.
com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=6&ved=0CEwQFjAFahU
KEwiY18CB143JAhVB5iYKHUP9AbE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.oecd.
org%2Fenvironment%2Fenvironment-development%2F50559116.pdf&usg=A
FQjCNFe2PpRR14wvhO5o85MQA_RfBJ2cw [hereinafter “Green Growth”] 
(“Choosing not to bring more land under cultivation because of the high envi-
ronmental costs will be difficult for a country with high levels of poverty.”).
7  See Markets and Payments for Environmental Services, Int’l Inst. for Env’t 
and Dev., http://www.iied.org/markets-payments-for-environmental-services 
(last visited Nov. 6, 2015) [hereinafter “Markets and Payments for Environmen-
tal Services”]. These payments are similar, incentive-wise to subsidies and taxes 
on land for the purposes of achieving conservation goals.
8  See id.; see also KatoomBa grP. and UneP, PaymentS for ecoSyStem 
ServiceS getting Started: a Primer 5, 26 (2008), available at http://www.
unep.org/pdf/PaymentsForEcosystemServices_en.pdf [hereinafter PaymentS for 
ecoSyStem ServiceS getting Started] (discussing how payment for watershed 
services currently exists in Costa Rica, Ecuador, Bolivia, India, South Africa, 
Mexico, and the United States).
9  Alternatively, many support the contention that PES is instead character-
ized by the “common but differentiated” principle because historically, devel-
oped countries fund PES projects in less developed countries to promote an 
identified conservation goal, thereby reducing activity responsible for producing 
climate change effects in exchange for a fee. Therefore, the common purpose is 
served: reducing climate change impacts. See natUral reS. mgmt. and env’t 
deP’t food and agric. org. of the United nationS, PaymentS for environ-
mental ServiceS within the context of the green economy 4 (Sept. 2010), 
endnoteS: ridding PeS SyStemS of the “Pay to PollUte” PrinciPle: PeS oPtimization StrategieS
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available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/al922e/al922e00.pdf [hereinafter 
Payments for environmental services].
10  Even commitments operating under a guise of true hard commitments to 
mitigate emissions fall prey to the “pay to pollute” concept because even the 
Kyoto Protocol allows for carbon credits and trading schemes. See Payments 
for ecosystem services GettinG started, supra note 8, at 5.
11  See id. at 3, 5, 10.
12  See id. at 11, 12 (describing the problems associated with PES including: 
leakage wherein service providers merely shift unsustainable land management 
operations to other areas not covered by the agreement; lacking institutional 
capacity and transparency; land ownership issues and lacking property rights 
regimes).
13  See generally John M. Broder, At Meeting on Climate Change, Urgent 
Issues but Low Expectations, n.y. times (Nov. 27, 2011), http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/11/28/science/earth/nations-meet-to-address-problems-of-climate-
change.html?_r=0 (noting how the United States and other countries with 
similar stances adamantly oppose making unilateral binding emission target 
commitments); Mike McDonald, US debt helps Costa Rica save planet, tico 
times (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.ticotimes.net/2010/11/30/us-debt-helps-
costa-rica-save-planet (reporting on how the United States funded five Costa 
Rican forest conservation initiatives by forgiving a portion of Costa Rican 
debt).
14  See generally Markets and Payments for Environmental Services, supra 
note 7.
15  See generally id. (discussing PES as a market-based conservation strategy).
16  Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA) and Oil Pollution Act (OPA), both statutory bodies 
allow for the restoration of natural resources lost in the spill or leakage. See 
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 107(a)(4)(C) (“damages for injury to, destruction of, 
or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such 
injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release”); 33 U.S.C. §1012(a)
(2). The measure of damages is the cost of restoring injured resources to their 
baseline condition. See 43 CFR Part 11; 15 CFR Part 990.
17  int’l Bank for reconstruction and dev./World Bank, lessons learned 
for redd+ from Pes and conservation incentive ProGrams 79 (2012), 
available at http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/sites/forestcarbonpartner-
ship.org/files/Documents/Full%20version%20of%20PES%20Lessons%20
for%20REDD+%20March%202012.pdf [hereinafter lessons learned for 
redd+].
18  convention on BioloGical diversity, case studies of Biodiversity mar-
kets for forest environmental services 10, available at https://www.cbd.int/
financial/pes/several-pes-iied.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2015).
19  See Markets and Payments for Environmental Services, supra note 7.
20  See Payments for ecosystem services GettinG started, supra note 8, at 
11, 12.
21  See id.
22  See generally Green GroWth, supra note 6, at 10 (“Choosing not to bring 
more land under cultivation because of the high environmental costs will be 
difficult for a country with high levels of poverty.”).
23  See generally Payments for ecosystem services GettinG started, supra 
note 8, at 45-46 (indicating that each member of the communally owned prop-
erty has property transfer rights, and therefore some decision making capacity). 
Also, communal property regimes are more common in developing countries, 
which makes this strategy congruent with strategy number three: targeting 
developing countries. See id. at 10 (citing that as many as twenty percent of 
forests formally recognized as communally owned); David Bray, Mexican 
Common Property Forest Governance, http://p2pfoundation.net/Mexican_Com-
mon_Property_Forest_Governance (last updated July 18, 2013) (indicating that 
democratic land management such as communal property ownership is effective 
in the context of PES implementations because there are lower transaction 
costs, a sense of kinship and mutual knowledge, and easier governance, includ-
ing self-governance using community leaders and an elected assembly that has 
decision making and contract monitoring capacity).
24  See Payments for environmental services, supra note 8, at 9.
25  sissel WaGe, investinG in the future: an assessment of Private sector 
demand for enGaGinG in markets & Payments for ecosystem services, 6 
(Mar. 2007), available at http://www.katoombagroup.org/documents/tools/FT-
FAO_Private%20Sector%20Buyers%20Report%20_Mar%2007.pdf (explaining 
that the majority of PES transactions for private investors are in the realms of 
mitigation and carbon credit trading).
26  See Payments for ecosystem services GettinG started, supra note 8, at 
15, 16, 50 (citing negative externalities such as leakage).
27  See generally Environmental and Social Safeguards, European Inv. Bank, 
(June 19, 2006), http://www.eib.org/infocentre/press/news/all/environmental-
and-social-safeguards.htm [hereinafter Environmental and Social Safeguards] 
(discussing the necessity of conducting environmental and biodiversity impact 
assessments prior to securing funding for a project and the Natural Capital 
Financing Facility (NCFF) which supports ecosystem service projects and 
requires the same safeguards as other projects facilitated by the EIB).
28 See euroPean inv. Bank, the eiB statement of environmental and 
social PrinciPles and standards 11 (2009), available at http://www.eib.org/
attachments/strategies/eib_statement_esps_en.pdf (describing that one of the 
EIB’s objectives is to monitor the environmental and social performance of the 
projects it finances, including the specific obligations described in the Financing 
Contract with the entity receiving funding to encourage transparency, participa-
tion and consultation, and integrated planning).
29  See Environmental and Social Safeguards, supra note 27.
30  See lessons learned for redd+, supra note 17, at xvii. PSAB is 
currently funded through a conglomerate of federal sources, “amounting to 
approximately $100 million USD of project funds per year, distributed through 
the Mexican Forest Fund” and currently covers 2.2 million hectares of forest. 
Most of the Mexican Forest Fund’s budget comes from the CONAFOR and 
international donors such as the World Bank. See id. at 115-16. The communal 
property system is comprised of two structures: Mexican ejidos and commu-
nidades; the former entails farmers without a land title, whereas the latter are 
indigenous people holding territories tracing back to the Spanish crown; see 
David Bray, Mexican Common Property Forest Governance, http://p2pfounda-
tion.net/Mexican_Common_Property_Forest_Governance (last visited Nov. 15, 
2015).
31  See lessons learned for redd+, supra note 17, at 16. Remote sensing 
is scanning the Earth by satellite or aircraft to gather information about the 
surface, atmosphere, and water.
32  See id. at 49. Conservation responsibilities are also doled out to inde-
pendent government entities, such as the Ministry of Environment, leading to 
environmental goals that are more likely to remain at the forefront of priorities 
and reporting and enforcement mechanisms are readily available. See id. at 2-3.
33  See id. (The national ProArbol Technical Committee is a sub-committee 
comprised of representatives from the federal government, civil society, indig-
enous and rural communities, and the timber industry).
34  Jarrod russell, Payments for environmental services: a market mech-
anism ProtectinG latin american forests, evidence and lessons from latin 
america 5, available at http://ella.practicalaction.org/wp-content/uploads/
files/131112_ENV_TheGreEco_BRIEF4.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2015).
35  See generally lessons learned for redd+, supra note 17, at 79.
36  See generally id. at xvii.
37  See generally Meetings: Upcoming Sessions, United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, https://unfccc.int/meetings/upcoming_sessions/
items/6239.php (last visited Nov. 6, 2015) (noting CoP 21 scheduled Paris 
France for November and December 2015).
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